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NOTE
CELEBRITY GOODWILL:
NAILING JELLO TO THE WALL
I. NTRODUCTION
In 1985 Joe and Nancy Piscopo filed for divorce in New Jersey
Summarizing the Piscopo's relationship, the New Jersey Superior Court
stated:
Joseph and... Nancy Piscopo met in 1970, lived together while
students at Jones College, Jacksonville, Florida, married in 1973
and focused themselves on one goal-to facilitate Joseph's rise
to stardom. Their arrangement required that [Nancy] attend to
[Joe's] every personal special need while keeping house, bearing
and raising their child and being a sounding board for [Joe's]
artistic ideas. It took them ten years to move [Joe] from penury
to celebrity.
2
After dividing the tangible assets of the Piscopo estate, the court
awarded Nancy monies representing her share of Joe's "celebrity good-
will."3 No court in New Jersey had ever awarded an interest in celebrity
goodwill, and no court in the nation had ever used that term.4
On appeal, neither party contested Joe's celebrity status; however, Joe
argued that even if an asset such as celebrity goodwill did exist, it could
not be awarded because it could not be valued.5 Nancy argued that Joe did
have celebrity goodwill and that any difficulties in valuation were
immaterial-equity demanded an award.6
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed the
award.7 The court held that celebrity goodwill was a divisible asset upon
1. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190, 1191 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988), affld in part, 557
A.2d 1040 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989), cert. denied, 564 A.2d 875 (NJ. 1989). Joe is
probably best known for his work during the early 1980's on the weekly television show Saturday
Night Live.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1193.
4. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040, 1040 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989), cert. denied,




616 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13
marital dissolution This ruling very likely caused divorce lawyers across
the country to amend both complaints and fee agreements while celebrities
with rocky marriages suddenly invested millions in flowers, candy,
diamonds, cars, and houses to win back the affection of their non-celebrity
spouses.
In his article on goodwill and dissolution, Ira Lurvey described
goodwill as "amorphous, ephemeral, elusive; and, by general definition,
speculative and uncertain .... ."' Taking the concept one step further,
defining "celebrity" goodwill is like trying to nail jello to the wall."° The
unique qualities of the entertainment industry increase the uncertainty
prevalent throughout the goodwill analysis. Popularity, scandal, nepotism,
publicity, timing, and luck all contribute unpredictably to the success or
failure of a celebrity.
In general, in any goodwill analysis, a court should engage in four
stages of analysis." First, the court should decide on a definition of
goodwill. Then, it should determine whether or not goodwill exists within
the parameters of the chosen definition. Once it finds goodwill, the court
should next determine whether it is "property" subject to distribution under
the applicable laws of the jurisdiction. Finally, if the court gets over all of
the preceding hurdles, it should ascribe a value to the goodwill.
8. New Jersey is an equitable distribution jurisdiction, as opposed to a community property
state. In a community property state, a court usually strives to divide the assets acquired during
the marriage equally. Those assets separately acquired prior to the marriage are not divided. For
example, in California, "the court may award any asset to one party on such conditions as it
deems proper to effect a substantially equal division of the property." CAL. Civ. CODE §
4800(b)(1) (West 1992) (emphasis added).
In an equitable distribution jurisdiction, the court is given broader discretion in making
dissolution awards to achieve what it feels is "fair," regardless of the source of the asset.
HAROLD E. VERRALL & GAIL BOREMAN BiRD, CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY 3 (5th ed.
1988). The relevant language from New Jersey's equitable distribution statute provides that the
court may "effectuate an equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal, which was
legally and beneficially acquired by them or either of them during the marriage." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West 1992) (emphasis added). The court included Joe Piscopo's celebrity
goodwill as property within the meaning of this statute.
9. Ira Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Marital Dissolution: Is It Property or Another Name
for Alimony?, 52 CAL. ST. BJ. 27, 30 (1977).
10. By suggesting jello is not easily affixed to a wall using nails, this author does not wish
to suggest that jello is in any way an inferior food product, or that jello should be subjected to
pointless acts of violence and persecution. This author merely suggests that the unique properties
of jello lend themselves to this particular analogy.
11. See, e.g., Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1 (NJ. 1983).
CELEBRITY GOODWILL
This Note traces the development of celebrity goodwill and discusses
whether or not Joe had it.12 The Note then discusses whether celebrity
goodwill is property subject to dissolution under New Jersey law.13 Next,
the Note examines the valuation process used by the court. 4 Finally, this
Note discusses the equity dilemma surrounding celebrity goodwill and
suggests an alternative approach for assessing the celebrity goodwill that
more accurately reflects the Piscopo court's 5 motivation for finding that
celebrity goodwill existed. 6
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CELEBRITY GOODWILL
Most courts generally agree that two basic types of goodwill
exist-commercial and professional.17 Commercial goodwill, also known
as business goodwill, is usually associated with a company."i Professional
goodwill is usually associated with individuals engaged in the private
practice of a profession, as with a doctor or lawyer.19 The Piscopo court
developed celebrity goodwill by analogizing it to professional goodwill.'
Interestingly, the choice of professional goodwill as a basis for celebrity
goodwill was more a product of necessity than any profound legal
reasoning, since many of the elements necessary for a valuation of
commercial goodwill were missing in the Piscopo case.21 However, even
if the court had been able to analyze and value the goodwill of Joe's
company under the concept of business goodwill, in all likelihood the result
would have been the same.'
12. See infra part 1I.
13. See infra part 1I.
14. See infra part V.
15. Since the appellate decision basically affirmed the decision of the trial court, for the
purposes of this Note, the term "Piscopo court' will refer both to the New Jersey trial court in
Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988), and the New Jersey appellate
court in Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040 (NJ. Super Ct. App. Div. 1989), unless a citation
refers specifically to one of the two decisions.
16. See infra part VI.
17. For a more complete discussion of the differences between personal or professional
goodwill and business or enterprise goodwill, see James T. Friedman, Professional Practice
Goodwill: An Abused Value Concept, 2 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 23, 24 (1986).
18. Michael E. Davis, Valuation of Professional Goodwill Upon Marital Dissolution, 7 SW.
U. L. REv. 186, 189 (1975).
19. Id.
20. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190, 1191-92 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988).
21. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
22. See discussion infra part V.
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A. A Goodwill Definition
Goodwill has never been an easy concept to define.' Historically,
New Jersey courts have attempted to define goodwill in terms of what it is
not. For example, the case law prior to 1988 held that goodwill was not
merely enhanced earning capacity.' The classic case of enhanced earning
capacity involves a spouse who works to support the other spouse's further
education. Once the "enhanced" spouse has obtained his or her degree, the
couple divorces.' New Jersey has held that a degree or the enhanced
earning capacity it represents is not a divisible asset because it is too
speculative.' Thus, in New Jersey, while enhanced earning capacity may
be a factor in determining the existence of goodwill, other elements are also
required.27
Other jurisdictions have defined goodwill as reputation.' Unlike the
"enhanced earning capacity" jurisdictions, the "reputation" jurisdictions
ascribe goodwill based upon a business's reputation, an asset developed
over time.29 These jurisdictions adopt the rationale that "[biroadly
defined, a firm's goodwill is its reputation, an asset that allows the firm to
generate greater earnings than a firm lacking goodwill." '3
23. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
24. "Goodwill is to be differentiated from earning capacity. It reflects not simply a possibility
of future earnings, but a probability based on existing circumstances." Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d
1, 6 (NJ. 1983).
25. An exhaustive exploration of this scenario can be found in Deborah A. Batts, Remedy
Refocus: In Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse" Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv.
751 (1988).
26. See, e.g., Lynn v. Lynn, 453 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982). Along these same lines, Deborah
Batts suggests jurisdictions that rely exclusively on enhanced earning capacity as a goodwill
definition often fail to consider the ability, diligence, etc. that the enhanced spouse contributed
toward his or her own enhancement. Batts, supra note 25, at 781.
27. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
28. The State of Wisconsin is one example. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d
343 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
29. "Although a professional business's good reputation, which is essentially what its goodwill
consists of, is certainly a thing of value, we do not believe that it bestows on those who have an
ownership interest in the business, an actual, separate property interest." Id. at 354. Further,
"[t]he element of time is usually a very important factor in the determination of and measure of
goodwill. Thus, goodwill does not ordinarily come into existence immediately upon the
establishment of a business, or even within a few months of its establishment." Joseph R. Wall,
The Recognition and Valuation of Professional Goodwill in the Marital Estate, 66 MARQ. L. REv.
697, 702 (1983).
30. Reginald A. Emshoff, Valuation of a Professional Practice, 55 Wis. B. BULL. 10, 11
(1982).
CELEBRiTY GOODWILL
New Jersey adopts a broader vision of goodwill than either the
"enhanced earning capacity" or the "reputation" jurisdictions. "In a broad
sense goodwill includes a whole host of intangibles including the quality
of management, the ability of the organization to produce and market
efficiently, and the existence and nature of competition."31  Further,
"[gloodwill is generally regarded as the summation of all the special
advantages, not otherwise identifiable, related to a going concern. It
includes such items as a good name, capable staff and personnel, high
credit standing, reputation for products and services, and favorable
location."
32
The Piscopo court claimed to adopt its definition of goodwill from
Dugan v. Dugan, a New Jersey Supreme Court decision.33 Dugan defined
goodwill as "essentially reputation that [would] probably generate future
business."'  By using the words "essentially reputation," the Dugan court
distinguished its definition from those that relied exclusively on reputation.
Additionally, this definition incorporated the enhanced or future earnings
idea by using the "future business" language. Finally, this definition added
the requirement of probability of future business.35 Thus, in New Jersey,
there must be more than mere reputation or enhanced earning capacity to
constitute goodwill; there must also be a probability of future business/
earnings, not just a possibility.
B. Celebrity Goodwill in New Jersey
Where Dugan established the standard for a goodwill definition upon
marital dissolution in New Jersey, Piscopo established the standard for
celebrity goodwill. In Joe Piscopo's case, all of his work was owned by
Piscopo Productions, 51% of which was owned by Joe, 48% by Nancy and
1% by Joe's father.36 Joe was paid through this company.37 Due to this
business framework, it might have made more sense to value the goodwill
31. Dugan, 457 A.2d at 4-5.
32. Id. at 4 (citing J.M. SMITH & K.F. SKOUSEN, INTERMEDIATE AccoUNTING 283 (7th ed.
standard vol. 1982)).
33. lId at 1.
34. lId at 3.
35. "Future earning capacity per se is not goodwill. However, when that future earning
capacity has been enhanced because reputation leads to probable future patronage from existing
and potential clients, goodwill may exist and have value" Id. at 6.
36. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190, 1190 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988).
37. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040, 1041 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
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of the business. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, the Piscopo court
was probably forced to analogize celebrity goodwill to professional
goodwill rather than to commercial goodwill.3 ' The accountant who
calculated the valuation was unable to determine a value for the goodwill
of the business because several factors used in the "accepted" valuation
formula were missing.39 Since Joe's corporation had no tangible assets,
other than Joe himself, and since determining a reasonable compensation
for Joe was impossible, the accountant was unable to use any traditional
commercial goodwill valuation formulas ° However, had the court been
able to value the goodwill of Joe's business using a business goodwill
model, the amount of the goodwill award might not have been different
from that determined under the professional goodwill analysis.41
In light of its decision to use professional goodwill as the model for
celebrity goodwill, had the Piscopo court followed the New Jersey Supreme
Court precedent and the Dugan definition of goodwill, the Piscopo court
should have defined celebrity goodwill as essentially Joe's reputation
coupled with the probability that he would obtain future business.42
Assuming such a definition, Joe argued that although he was a celebrity,
the volatile nature of the entertainment industry actually suggested only the
possibility, not the probability, of future business.43 Ignoring his argu-
ment, the court distinguished Dugan by stating the distinction made in
Dugan between possible and probable earnings referred only to a new
professional degree untested in the marketplace.44 Here, since Joe had a
"track record" of past earnings, the court discounted the argument rather
than address the peculiarities of the entertainment world.4' What the court
failed to explain was why the Dugan court included a requirement of
probability when the professional involved there also had a "track record"
of past earnings.46
38. Id.
39. Francis W. Donahue & Gary N. Skoloff, Court Views Celebrity Goodwill As Part of
Assets in Divorce Case, NAT'L. L. J., Aug. 14, 1989, at 18.
40. See infra note 102.
41. See discussion infra part V.
42. See supra notes 33-35.
43. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040, 1040 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). Interestingly,
if Joe were making this argument today, the court may be persuaded. Since his divorce, Joe has
all but dropped from the limelight.
44. Piscopo, 557 A.2d at 1042.
45. Id.
46. See generally Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1 (NJ. 1983).
CELEBRITY GOODWILL
Thus, in Piscopo, the court appeared to rely on New Jersey precedent
by reciting the definition of goodwill from Dugan, but then emasculated the
definition to accommodate the new concept of celebrity goodwill. Strict
adherence to the New Jersey definition of goodwill would have required a
finding of probable, not merely possible, future earnings. In an industry
where artist Andy Warhol estimated the duration of the average person's
fame at fifteen minutes,47 a finding of probable future earnings would
seemingly be impossible.
Joe argued that only a "superstar" would have probable future
earnings within the meaning of the Dugan definition.' A celebrity of
Frank Sinatra's status, for example, would have deferred compensation
agreements, royalties, residuals, and long term contracts, thereby facilitating
a more accurate prediction of probable future earnings.49 Even though Joe
had none of these assets, and presumably then, no probable future earnings,
the court found that Joe had celebrity goodwill.5"
C. The Peer Problem
After choosing a definition for celebrity goodwill and stretching that
definition to include Joe, the Piscopo court knocked down another hurdle
posted by the Dugan court. The court in Dugan implied an additional test
for determining the existence of goodwill in the court's valuation analysis.
This determination is based upon a peer assessment-a comparison between
the income of the professional involved in the divorce and the incomes of
his peers to arrive at an equitable valuation.
In Dugan, the court valued the goodwill of an attorney.52 In
determining whether or not goodwill existed and as part of the valuation
analysis, the court measured Mr. Dugan's income for the past five years
and subtracted the average income of an attorney of similar age, experience,
and capability.53 These excess earnings were capitalized-multiplied by
an "equitable" fraction-to determine the value of the goodwill.'
Apparently then, if Mr. Dugan had no "peers," the court either would not
47. DR. LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER'S QUOTATIONS: IDEAS FOR OUR TIME 183 (1977).
48. See Donahue, supra note 39, at 21.
49. IU
50. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040, 1043 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1989).
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have found goodwill, or would not have been able to value it. Granted, the
determination of who exactly is one's peer gives the court a lot of leeway
in determining whether or not goodwill exists. By choosing a sufficiently
impoverished "equal" the court can, in furtherance of equity, find goodwill
in almost any instance. Nevertheless, to use this capitalization method, one
still needs a peer.1
5
In the Piscopo case, arguably Joe had no peer. Success in the
entertainment industry is a combination of a variety of factors that may be
totally unrelated to the entertainer's experience, education, and capability.
Should Joe's peer be taken from the pool of all actors, employed or
unemployed, that have similar characteristics? Is his peer a comedian or
an actor/comedian? Obviously, the court had great leeway in selecting a
peer that would yield the existence of goodwill. Predictably, it held that
Joe had excess earnings, although it did not identify who his peers were. 6
m1. BUT IS CELEBRITY GOODWILL PROPERTY?
Whether or not Joe had celebrity goodwill would be irrelevant to the
dissolution proceedings if such an "asset" was not property. New Jersey's
equitable distribution statute allows New Jersey courts to make awards "to
effectuate an equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal,
which was legally and beneficially acquired by them or either of them
during the marriage.""7 The Piscopo court relied on two previous New
York cases in making its determination that Joe's celebrity goodwill was
property, and therefore, a divisible marital asset. 8
55. "[Clapitalization... computes excess earnings by comparing the average income of the
independent professional to the average income of a salaried professional of equivalent stature."
Eve Barrie Masinter, Professional Goodwill in Louisiana: An Analysis of its Classification,
Valuation, and Partition, 43 LA. L. REV. 119, 145 (1982).
56. In Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988), the trial judge was
not satisfied that enough evidence had been introduced at the trial describing a "peer," and
ordered that "[tihe parties shall have 60 days to supplement the record or to accept the figures
reached by the court in its oral decision." Id. at 1193. The appellate court did not address the
issue of who Joe's peers might be. See generally Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1989). Presumably then, either Nancy was able to sufficiently identify Joe's peers after the
trial, or the Piscopo courts effectively ignored the precedent established in Dugan by abandoning
the peer assessment valuation method described in Dugan.
57. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West 1992).
58. Piscopo, 555 A.2d at 1190 (The court cites to Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1988), and since Golub is based upon O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985),
the Piscopo court impliedly adopts O'Brien).
CELEBRITY GOODWILL
In O'Brien v. O'Brien,59 the Court of Appeals of New York held that
a doctor's newly acquired license to practice medicine was marital property,
and it made a distributive award accordingly.60 The New York court
found that a medical license, despite not fitting within the traditional
common law definitions of property, was within the scope of marital
property.61 The court relied on the legislative purpose behind New York's
Equitable Distribution Law62 and stated:
[Tihe New York Legislature deliberately went beyond traditional
property concepts when it formulated the Equitable Distribution
Law.... [O]ur statute recognizes that spouses have an equitable
claim to things of value arising out of the marital relationship
and classifies them as subject to distribution by focusing on the
marital status of the parties at the time of acquisition. Those
things acquired during marriage and subject to distribution have
been classified as "marital property" although, as one commen-
tator has observed, they hardly fall within the traditional
property concepts .... 63
In O'Brien, the only significant asset the couple possessed was the
husband's medical license.'
The second case the Piscopo court relied upon was Golub v. Golub.65
In Golub, the court generalized the O'Brien holding to include all sources
of enhanced earning capacity. 66 Golub involved a model whose earning
capacity had been increased during the course of the marriage due in part
to contributions made by her husband.67 The court expanded the defini-
tion of marital property to include "a spouse's unique ability to commer-
cially exploit his or her fame." 8 The New York court held that the
59. 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
60. Id. at 712.
61. See generally Ud
62. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236[B][1][c] (McKinney 1992).
63. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 715.
64. Id. at 714.
65. 527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
66. Extending O'Brien, the court said: "In O'Brien, the fact that the professional license itself
had no market value was irrelevant. It is the enhanced earning capacity that the license affords
the holder that is of value. In this respect, all sources of enhanced earning capacity become
indistinguishable." ld. at 949.
67. Il at 947-48.
68. Ma at 949.
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husband was entitled to a share of his spouse's fame.69  The court also
suggested that goodwill exists with any "exceptional wage earner."70
Relying on these precedents, the Piscopo court held that Joe's
celebrity goodwill was marital property.71 This reliance, however, is
problematic. First, the O'Brien case involved a situation where no goodwill
would have been found under New Jersey law.72 Since the husband's
medical license was "newly acquired," the reputation element the Piscopo
court (using the Dugan definition of goodwill) would require, was absent.
Additionally, in O'Brien, the medical license was the only significant asset
the family possessed.' The Piscopos had several other assets, therefore
the equitable motivations behind the O'Brien finding would not be as
persuasive in the context of the Piscopo case.
• Turning to the Golub case, the definition of goodwill Golub used also
contradicted the Dugan definition upon which the Piscopo court relied.
The Golub court treated enhanced earning capacity alone as sufficient
evidence to establish goodwill.74 Both the O'Brien and the Golub courts
relied upon the legislative intent behind New York's Equitable Distribution
statute. They did not consider arguments from courts of other states that
had equitable distribution statutes.75 The O'Brien and Golub courts
recognized that decisions of other states relied principally on their own
statutes and the legislative history underlying them, and should therefore
not control in New York.76 The Piscopo court opted to do the reverse,
incorporating the intent of the New York legislature into the New Jersey
statute, while discounting the case law of its own state.7 The Piscopo
69. 1& at 950.
70. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
71. See generally Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190.
72. See generally O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712.
73. ld. at 714.
74. See generally Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946.
75. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 715; Golub impliedly recognizes this through its adoption and
citation of O'Brien. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
76. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 715.
77. "'[A] person's earning capacity, even where its development has been aided and enhanced
by the other spouse, as is here the case, should not be recognized as a separate, particular item
of property' within the meaning of the New Jersey statute. Potential earning capacity is a factor
in determining what distribution of marital property will be 'equitable' and is obviously relevant
on the issue of alimony, but the court held it should not itself be deemed property." Grier H.
Raggio, Jr., Professional Goodwill and Professional Licenses as Property Subject to Distribution
upon Dissolution of Marriage, 16 FAM. L. Q. 147, 156 (1982) (quoting Stem v. Stem, 331 A.2d
257, 260 (NJ. 1975)).
See also Lynn v. Lynn, 453 A.2d 539 (NJ. 1982) (A medical license is not marital
property subject to distribution in New Jersey.).
CELEBRITY GOODWILL
court's only comment was that "[p]laintiff's reliance on [the New Jersey
cases was] misplaced."78
IV. THE TALENT ARGUMENTS: A DANGEROUS TREND
It was within this framework of O'Brien and Golub that the Piscopo
court decided its case. O'Brien had held that the enhanced earning capacity
represented by a professional degree untested in the marketplace was a
divisible asset upon marital dissolution.79 Golub held that any enhanced
earning capacity developed during the marriage could be valued and
divided upon dissolution. 0 The Piscopo court extended these two cases,
holding that Joe's increased celebrity status and enhanced earning capacity
constituted celebrity goodwill, subject to valuation and division upon
dissolution."'
Joe argued that this increased celebrity status was due exclusively to
his own innate talent.8 2 As such, the status was not subject to valuation
and division upon dissolution. He first argued that since his talent was not
alienable, it was not divisible.8 3 While not directly addressing this talent
argument, the court sidestepped the issue by holding that Joe's right of
publicity-his right to exploit himself and his likeness-was alienable.'
Subsequent to the Piscopo case, a New York superior court decided
Elkus v. Elkus, 5 and discussed the talent arguments. Elkus involved opera
singer Frederica von Stade. 6 Prior to her marriage, she worked with New
York's Metropolitan Opera Company and was only paid $2,250 per year.87
She married Peter Elkus, who gave up his own singing career to train
Frederica and raise their children. 8 Upon dissolution, Frederica was
making $621,878 per year.89 The court held that the enhanced earning
78. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040, 1043 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
79. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
80. Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946, 950 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
81. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190, 1193 (NJ. Super. CL Ch. Div. 1988), aff'd 557 A.2d
1040 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1989).
82. Appellant's Brief at 33, Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div.
1989) (portions ordered sealed).
83. Id.
84. See infra notes 117-130 and accompanying text.
85. Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
86. Id.
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capacity was a divisible asset for the purpose of dissolution. 0 Unlike
Golub, where the enhanced earning capacity of the celebrity spouse, Marisa
Berenson, was due in large part to the marketing and managerial skills of
her husband," here Frederica's enhanced earning capacity was a product
of Frederica's voice, albeit refined by Peter.92
One commentator, Janine Menhennet, in her article Elkus v. Elkus:
A Step in the Wrong Direction,93 criticizes the decision of the Elkus court,
articulating many of the talent arguments made by Joe in his appellate
brief. 4 However, the Elkus court rejected these arguments, holding that,
"[w]hile it is true that [Frederica] was born with talent ... [d]uring the
course of the marriage, [her husband's] active involvement in [Frederica's]
career, in teaching, coaching, and critiquing her, as well as in caring for
their children, clearly contributed to the increase in its value."'95
Thus, in New York, "the enhanced skills of an artist ... , albeit
growing from an innate talent, which have enabled her to become an
exceptional earner, may be valued as marital property subject to equitable
distribution."'  The import of this statement by the Elkus court cannot be
overemphasized. What the Elkus court has essentially done is to extend the
holdings of O'Brien and Golub from valuation of enhanced earning
capacity to valuation of enhanced skills.97
Returning to the Piscopo case, the New Jersey court rejected the talent
arguments without discussion and gave no explanation for the absence.9'
Because the Piscopo court relied so heavily on New York precedent in its
decision, if the talent arguments were again raised in New Jersey, most
likely the court would simply rely on Elkus as precedent, rather than
address the talent arguments. Elkus' valuation of "enhanced skills" would
completely fly in the face of the New Jersey definition of goodwill taken
from Dugan and cited by Piscopo.
90. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
91. See generally Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
92. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
93. Janine R. Menhennet, Elkus v. Elkus: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 12 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L.J. 561 (1992).
94. Appellant's Brief at 32-35, Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div.
1989) (portions ordered sealed).
95. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Piscopo, 557 A.2d at 1040.
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Dugan held that goodwill was reputation coupled with the probability
of future earnings.99 Piscopo seemingly altered that definition to encom-
pass Joe, requiring only the possibility of future earnings."° Reliance on
Elkus by a New Jersey court would radically alter the definition of celebrity
goodwill, reducing it to a mere requirement of "enhanced skills." Thus, if
New Jersey continues to follow New York case law, the definition of
celebrity goodwill will likely continue to erode. Perhaps in the very near
future, any "skilled" celebrity divorcing in New Jersey will automatically
be found to have celebrity goodwill, regardless of the status of his career,
and be forced to pay an "equitable" share to his non-celebrity spouse.
V. THE VALUATION MYSTERY
After determining that celebrity goodwill existed and it was property
subject to distribution within the New Jersey statute, the Piscopo court was
next confronted with the question of valuation.01' Numerous courts and
commentators have suggested various valuation methods for celebrity
goodwill."°  Because of the way Joe's finances were structured, the
method that probably would have made the most sense would have been to
value the goodwill of Joe's business. However, two of the variables in the
business valuation formula were missing in Piscopo's case, so the court-
appointed expert was unable to use any traditional business/commercial
goodwill valuation formulas."
Undaunted, Irwin Marks, the court-appointed expert, did calculate a
value of Joe's celebrity status based upon an "accepted" formula." 4 Mr.
Marks took 25% of Joe's average gross earnings for three of the past five
99. Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 3 (NJ. 1983).
100. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
101. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040, 1041 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1989).
102. For a thorough coverage of the various valuation methods used see, e.g., Batts, supra
note 25, at 776-99; Mervyn B. Frumkes, Valuation of Professional Practices, 2 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW. 1, 16-22 (1986); Stuart B. Walzer & Jan C. Gabrielson, Celebrity Goodwill, 2 J.
AM. AcAD. MATRim. LAW. 40-43 (1986).
103. According to the accountant who valued Piscopo's celebrity goodwill, the fact that the
corporation had no tangible assets other than Joe and the impossibility of determining a reasonable
compensation for Joe precluded the use of the business goodwill formula. Donahue, supra note
39, at 18.
However, had the court been able to use one of the "traditional" business goodwill
valuation formulas, the valuation analysis and resulting award might not have been different from
what took place here. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
104. Donahue, supra note 39, at 18.
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years, eliminating two of the years because they were "abnormal.""0° The
court approved the formula with one small change-it included all five
years, presumably because New Jersey precedent required a minimum of
five years in its "traditional" capitalization formula, although New York
precedent probably had a similar requirement."°
No precedent existed in New Jersey or New York for the exact
capitalization method Mr. Marks used. The capitalization method of
valuation, which Mr. Marks' "accepted" formula most closely resembled,
requires three steps."° First, the average earnings for the past five plus
years are taken. Second, a reasonable return on the investment is deducted,
or in the case of an individual professional, the average income of a similar
practitioner is deducted. Finally, the remainder, or excess earnings are
capitalized using a higher percentage for riskier businesses and a lower
percentage for safer businesses." 8
The capitalization method of valuation has been criticized for being
over-inclusive." 9 Since the capitalization is based upon excess earnings,
critics argue that factors not properly classified as goodwill may contribute
to the excess earnings, thus causing inaccuracies.1 Mr. Marks' solution
to this problem was to remove the excess earnings element altogether. By
his own admission, a figure representing a reasonable income for Joe was
incalculable."' Thus, Mr. Marks assessed the goodwill based upon Joe's
average gross income without deducting a reasonable compensation,"' in
effect grossly overvaluing the goodwill by attributing all of Joe's earnings
to celebrity goodwill.
105. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040, 1041 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
106. Donohue, supra note 39, at 18.
107. See, e.g., Stem v. Stem, 331 A.2d 257 (NJ. 1975); Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1 (NJ.
1983).
108. The higher percentage is assessed with a riskier business because the formula assumes
that the riskier the business, the more likely goodwill contributed to the success of the business.
In such a business, the goodwill would thus be more valuable and the monetary award of goodwill
should therefore be a higher percentage of the average excess earnings. See Masinter, supra note
55, at 144-45.
109. Enshoff, supra note 30, at 12; see also, Davis, supra note 18, at 188.
110. "An analysis of fair compensation for an individual must take into account the character
of the practice and the hours and commitment that produce the earnings; the appraiser cannot
simply accept total earnings that are above average to have been the product of goodwill."
Emshoff, supra note 30, at 12; see also Davis, supra note 18, at 188.
111. See Donahue, supra note 39, at 18.
112. "He [Marks] calculated [Joe's] celebrity goodwill by taking 25% of his average gross
earnings .... He applied no further discount. He said that by using the figure of 25%, he had
already discounted the applicable percentage based upon his experience and training." Piscopo
v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040, 1041 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
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Mr. Marks admitted that he had never been involved in the purchase
or sale of a business where the sole source of income was a show business
celebrity."' Nevertheless, the court found the formula used by Mr.
Marks represented an equitable valuation. 4
Had the court been willing to value the goodwill of Joe's corporation,
the result might not have been any different. Using the capitalization
method, the court would first have subtracted the tangible assets, such as
office furniture, machinery, and product on hand. Theoretically, the
remainder would be the goodwill, and this figure would be capitalized.1
Joe's corporation had no tangible assets."16 Thus, the court would most
likely have looked to gross annual income anyway.
Had Joe not been in an equitable distribution jurisdiction, he could
have tried to limit the valuation of his celebrity goodwill to his right of
publicity. By characterizing some aspects of his celebrity goodwill as
separate property, Joe could have limited Nancy's total award. 7 The
Piscopo court derived celebrity goodwill in part from a celebrity's right of
publicity."' The court pointed out that: "In modem times, tort law
founded in privacy and right of publicity has protected infringement upon
'the celebrity's pecuniary interest in commercial exploitation of his
identity' .... Goodwill is, and always has been, a component of this
interest.""19 Further, "[t]he court cannot countenance the anomaly that
would result if one branch of Chancery vigorously protected plaintiff's
person and business from another's 'unjust enrichment by the theft of [his]
goodwill' ... while another branch deprived a spouse from sharing in that
very same protectable interest.""1ro
113. Mr. Marks also admitted that (1) he had no knowledge of such a business ever being
bought or sold, nor had he previously valued such a business; (2) the entertainment industry is
fraught with uncertainty and fluctuations in income; (3) one cannot predict or project from year
to year an entertainer's level of income absent a deferred compensation agreement, royalties,
residuals or long-term contract (none of which Joe Piscopo had); and (4) because the business of
being a celebrity is personal in nature, celebrity status itself cannot be transferred. Donahue,
supra note 39, at 18.
114. "We accept the accountant's [Marks] analysis which conforms to ours and to that of the
majority of states... ." Piscopo, 557 A.2d at 1043.
115. See, e.g., Stem v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257 (NJ. 1975); Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1 (NJ.
1983).
116. See supra note 103.
117. See supra note 8.
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The court did not enumerate exactly what constituted the "commercial
exploitation of identity." '  Some commentators draw a distinction
between representations of a celebrity's identity, and performances by the
celebrity himself."z Rosemarie Reed, a certified public accountant and
frequent expert in marital dissolution litigation, divides the exploitation into
"active" and "passive" categories."t She argues that income from the
celebrity's performances is separate property, while income from exploita-
tion of his name and likeness represents a return on the community
investment in his career."l This avoids the problem of dividing future
earnings,"2 while still awarding an interest in established property
rights.
12
Similarly, Harold Stanton, a former senior editor of the UCLA Law
Review and a member of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers,
divides a celebrity's rights into a right of publicity and a right of priva-
cy." Stanton argues that a celebrity has a right to exploit his persona,
as well as a right not to exploit his persona.125 He argues that the
problem with assessing the right of publicity upon dissolution is that it does
not factor in the right of privacy. The share in the right of publicity is
based on the potential value with full exploitation-use of and exposure in
all media.1 29  The celebrity's right to exercise his right of privacy is
thereby limited, since he is then forced to fully exploit himself or suffer
economic detriment. 3° The celebrity must, in effect, pay to exercise his
right of privacy.
Since the Piscopo court analogized to the right of publicity to
establish celebrity goodwill, it may have been open to an argument dividing
the goodwill into public and private elements. Analogizing to Reed's
theory, Joe could have asserted that only the potential earnings from the
exploitation of his likeness should have been considered in the division of
121. Md
122. See, e.g., Rosemarie Reed, Valuation of Celebrity Goodwill, BEVERLY HiLLs B. ASS'N
J., Spring 1990, at 67; Harold J. Stanton, Community Property and the Celebrity's Right of
Publicity, L.A. LAw., Apr. 1986, at 38.
123. Rosemarie Reed, supra note 122, at 67.
124. Id.
125. See infra part VI.B.
126. A celebrity's property interest in his or her likeness and the assignability of that interest
is well established. See, e.g., Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.NJ. 1981); All
v. Playgirl, Inc. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
127. Stanton, supra note 122, at 38.
128. Id. at 44-45.
129. Id at 46.
130. Id.; see also infra part VI.B.
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marital property. Then, factoring in Stanton's view, Joe could have
asserted that only those methods of exploitation previously utilized by Joe
should have been assessed in the valuation of his future earning potential
for the purposes of property division. This argument would limit celebrity
goodwill to a valuation based solely on earnings derived from past
exploitations of Joe's likeness. The court would then have averaged and
capitalized these past earnings, as opposed to Joe's gross earnings for the
five years, which would have theoretically reduced the award. In effect,
Joe could have turned the court's analogy to his benefit, assuming, of
course, that the court would have been open to such an argument.
VI. CELEBRITY GOODWILL AS AN EQUITABLE DILEMMA
Whether the court is defining, identifying, valuing, or distributing
goodwill, the central issue is equity. In performing these tasks, a court
seeks to remedy a perceived inequity between a professional, or as here a
celebrity spouse, and a non-celebrity spouse.131 The situation before the
Piscopo court is not an uncommon one, where one spouse supports the
other spouse for multiple years, sacrificing a higher standard of living in
anticipation of an even greater standard down the road; the couple then
divorces, and the court is limited to an award of alimony based on the
current standard of living. One can just imagine the celebrity spouse
hobnobbing 31 with the rich and famous at Spago's133 while the former
supporting spouse huddles in some tenement eating macaroni and
cheese 3
Since goodwill began with commercial transactions, some courts and
commentators have analogized the married couple to business partners.
35
In such a model, the couple works together to maximize their mutual
economic benefit. Upon divorce: "Effectually, it is the case of the silent
partner withdrawing from a going business. And, if such partner is to
receive fair compensation for her share, on her enforced retirement, it
131. See, e.g., Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946, 950 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
132. What the rich and famous do. See generally, e.g., Robin Leach's Lifestyles of the Rich
and Famous.
133. A restaurant in Hollywood where the rich and famous hobnob.
134. This author does not intend to suggest that macaroni and cheese possesses any culinary
deficiencies. The author has merely noted an economic correlation between income and food
choice and has chosen to use that relationship for the purposes of illustration.
135. For an exhaustive examination of this approach, see Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense
for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human
Capital, 86 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1984).
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should be so evaluated."' 136 Critics of this model argue that unlike a
business, couples often do not act in a business-like manner.'37 Often,
behavior within the marriage is motivated by other than economic reasons
and may in fact be economically detrimental to the "business.' '3
Further, critics also point out that traditional partnership and joint venture
law do not recognize investment in human capital as an asset.139 The
marriage-business model also creates problems in terms of assessing future
earnings." Thus, the analogy to a business partnership, while conve-
nient, is not without its flaws.
Other courts have resorted to rhetoric to justify goodwill awards. 1'
Still other courts have utilized a "shotgun" approach, suggesting numerous
equitable theories simultaneously to justify a goodwill award: "The three-
judge dissent ... suggested that the wife who supported her husband
through professional school should have a remedy at divorce 'based on
implied contract, quasi-contract, unjust enrichment or some similar
theory.""' 42 More likely than not, the rationale used by the majority of
courts, including the Piscopo court, is simply perceived unfairness.
Regardless of the motivation, caution must be taken to avoid the inadvertent
creation of greater inequities in the pursuit of a "fair" remedy.
A. The Intangible Problem
All goodwill inquiries seek to identify an intangible asset that a court
will then translate, using some valuation method, into a tangible asset for
division. "Goodwill should be valued with great care, for the individual
... will be forced to pay the ex-spouse 'tangible' dollars for an intangible
asset at a value concededly arrived at on the basis* of some uncertain
elements."'43  Despite this caution, courts place a higher value on
136. Brawman v. Brawman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109 (1962).
137. See, e.g., Batts, supra note 25 at 762-63.
138. For example, Deborah Batts discusses the unbusinesslike role love can play in a
marriage. Id. at 762-63.
139. Id at 756 n.21.
140. See infra part VI.B.
141. "[W]here one spouse had devoted years to an 'investment' in 'future family prosperity'
through supporting the other through professional school... it might 'work the grossest inequity'
not to give the supporting spouse a property interest in the 'increased earning potential .... '
Raggio, supra note 77, at 157-58 (quoting Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979)).
142. Id. at 157 (quoting Graham v. Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (Colo. 1978)).
143. Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 7 (NJ. 1983).
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remedying the perceived inequities than on the speculative nature of
valuation.1" The important point here is that courts do not eliminate the
speculative valuation problems; they just reprioritize them. Thus, while
uncertainty in valuation is not a bar to goodwill awards, it presents great
opportunities for the over or under valuation of such an asset, thereby
resulting in unfairness to one of the two parties.
Arguably, with celebrity goodwill, as shown in the Piscopo case, the
transition from intangible to tangible asset creates more uncertainties than
in other goodwill cases. Because the court in Piscopo did not strictly
adhere to the elements of the New Jersey goodwill definition, the "great
care" espoused by the Dugan court seemed to be lacking. 5 Driven more
by policy than caution, the Piscopo court adopted a valuation method that
lacked precedent, offered by an expert that lacked experience, the end result
of which may have created a greater inequity than the one the court sought
to remedy.
B. The Future Earnings Problem
In Professional Good Will in Dissolution Proceedings: The Personifi-
cation of Property,"'6 Tom Scribner discusses the theory of goodwill
valuation in terms of a right based upon a spouse's expectation:
SEBE [spousal economic benefit expectancy] is not a synonym
for professional good will.... Rather it recognizes good will
for what it is-potential future income based on an expectation
of continued public patronage.... A SEBE award requires the
court to consider the right of the non-professional to share in
future economic benefits of the professional. 47
Since the future earning capacity of the professional, celebrity, or enhanced
spouse seems to be the source of the goodwill dilemma, logically, the most
equitable solution would seem to be to divide up the future earn-
ings-award each spouse a percentage share in the future earnings. Since
the probability of the celebrity's future earnings is uncertain at best, this
type of arrangement is analogous to awarding a share in a vested pension.
When one spouse has worked a sufficient number of years to obtain a
144. See, e.g., id. at 7-8; Stern v. Stern 331 A.2d 257 (NJ. 1975); Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d
210 (NJ. 1980).
145. Dugan, 457 A.2d at 7.
146. Tom Scribner, Professional Good Will in Dissolution Proceedings: The Personification
of Property, 17 GONZAGA L. REV. 303 (1982).
147. Id. at 311.
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pension upon retirement, but is not yet eligible to collect the pension, the
pension has vested. When a divorce occurs at this juncture, courts will
often award a share in the pension, either payable in one lump sum, or as
a percentage share in the pension when it becomes collectable."4
Arguably, in a celebrity goodwill situation, the non-celebrity spouse
has a "vested" interest in the future earning potential of the celebrity spouse
by virtue of her contributions to his career. However, this interest cannot
be collected yet, because the future earnings have not been realized.
Awarding a percentage share of the future earnings eliminates much of the
speculation surrounding a celebrity goodwill valuation. Unfortunately, such
an arrangement comes closer to indentured servitude than equity, and thus
these types of awards are usually rejected on Thirteenth Amendment
grounds.149
To avoid Thirteenth Amendment problems, goodwill valuations must
be based on past earnings. 5' The Piscopo court adopted this rationale
and used the past five years of Joe's income to determine a "present" value
for his celebrity goodwill. 5 ' While this formula would seem to remove
future earnings from consideration, in reality, goodwill requires future
earnings for two purposes: as part of the valuation analysis and as payment
for the goodwill award. The first is most readily seen by analogizing to the
valuation of commercial goodwill.
Courts frequently use a "fair market value" measurement for goodwill
in commercial goodwill cases-the figure a reasonably informed purchaser
would pay for the business less the tangible assets yields the goodwill.'52
In such a valuation, "determination of fair market value necessarily involves
taking into account the future earning potential of the professional goodwill;
otherwise, the goodwill would attract a deflated price or suffer a valuation
of 'zero."' 53 Further, with respect to goodwill in general, "future earnings
bear significantly on the present value of goodwill. Valuation based on
148. See, e.g., Majauskas v. Majauskas, 463 N.E.2d 15 (N.Y. 1984); Kikkert v. Kikkert, 427
A.2d 76 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981), aft'd, 438 A.2d 317 (N.J. 1981).
149. The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that "[n]either slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
150. "Goodwill should be measured by arriving at a present value based upon past results and
not by speculating upon the postmarital effort of the professional spouse." Wall, supra note 29,
at 697.
151. Donahue, supra note 39, at 18.
152. Davis, supra note 18, at 198-200.
153. Masinter, supra note 55, at 143.
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past earnings and performance is primitive. The asset's value is really a
function of its present and future earning potential. Historic earnings are
of little real significance other than as predictors of future earnings.""
Thus, even though courts may not explicitly award a share of future
earnings, the possibility that courts consider future earnings in developing
a goodwill award seems very real.
Future earnings are inextricably wound up with goodwill in another
way. Arguably, unless already extremely wealthy, the celebrity or
professional will need future earnings to pay for the goodwill award
distributed to the spouse. Since goodwill is an award, not a form of
maintenance, it cannot be adjusted at a later time. Any award of goodwill
will require funds from future earnings simply to make the payments.
Thus, a goodwill award traps a professional into a particular line of work
and assumes success-which may make sense in a more stable profession,
such as medicine or law, but may not make sense in a volatile industry like
entertainment. Such an award again raises Thirteenth Amendment issues
as well.
Therefore, the big problem with awarding celebrity goodwill is that
in the entertainment world, the average celebrity's future, if there is such
a thing as an average celebrity, is basically a "crap shoot." The Piscopo
court seems to have resolved the matter in favor of the supporting spouse,
perhaps rationalizing that the enhanced spouse has more control over this
possible future success on which the couple gambled their marital
resources. But can equity really be achieved in an industry where success
is a complete gamble, and where, after dissolution one spouse can walk
away with a share of the winnings, while the celebrity spouse is not only
forced to continue gambling, but now has a huge gambling debt? The New
Jersey decision suggests that if courts wish to award celebrity goodwill, the
celebrity must bear the burden of the inequity.
C. Other Solutions
Recognizing that an equity problem exists, some courts have found
other solutions in the form of rehabilitative and reimbursement alimo-
ny.'55 Rehabilitative alimony recognizes that the non-celebrity spouse has
enhanced the earning capacity of the celebrity spouse and forces the
154. Bryan Mauldin, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing Professional Goodwill as Community
Property at Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 TUL. L. REV. 313, 333 (1981).
155. Batts, supra note 25, at 766-70.
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celebrity spouse to now aid the other spouse in attaining a higher income
capacity. 6 Reimbursement alimony seeks to repay the financial support
that the supporting spouse contributed to the enhanced spouse.
157
Both types of alimony have shortcomings. Rehabilitative alimony
often stops short of achieving true equity. For example, a person who
forgoes a teaching credential to put the spouse through medical school will
receive the funds necessary to complete perhaps eighteen months worth of
school, after supporting nine years of the spouse's education. Reimburse-
ment alimony looks like an easy way to make the supporting spouse
financially whole, but it does not yield any kind of return on the investment
on which the supporting spouse relied.
The most equitable solution would seem to be a combination of
rehabilitative and reimbursement alimony. The married couple anticipated
some reward for years of sacrifice, and now the supporting spouse will not
reap that reward. Fully reimbursing the spouse, not merely for financial
contribution, but also for not enjoying a higher standard of living, missed
opportunity costs, and any other costs the supporting spouse's attorney can
define, seems a more equitable method of valuing the celebrity good-
will.158 Granted, the value of these types of contributions would be
extremely speculative, but no more than the valuation formula used by the
Piscopo court. Further, such a method could yield larger awards than that
arrived at in Piscopo, but if the amount of the award seemed inequitably
high, a court could simply adjust the "value" of various contributions.
Regardless, such an award certainly makes more sense than the Piscopo
award.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Piscopo v. Piscopo, the New Jersey appellate court recognized an
inequity that existed between a celebrity and his supporting spouse.1" 9
After examining the relevant New Jersey law, the court labeled this inequity
"celebrity goodwill" and sought to divide this newly created "asset" to
resolve the inequity. Despite the presence of New Jersey Supreme Court
precedent defining goodwill for the purposes of marital dissolution,"6 the
156. Id
157. Id.
158. This type of award is known as a "cost acquisition" award and is developed and
described in detail. lt at 784-98.
159. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988).
160. Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1 (NJ. 1983).
CELEBRITY GOODWILL
appellate court chose to rely on New York precedent to support its holding,
even though the New York precedent was grounded in New York statutory
law.161
After trying to make celebrity goodwill seem a logical extension of
existing common law, despite the contrary supreme court precedent in its
own state, the court resorted to an entirely speculative and irrational
valuation formula to arrive at a figure it deemed equitable." The
formula was developed by an expert witness who had little or no experi-
ence in the entertainment industry." Further, the formula was unprece-
dented and most likely resulted in a gross overvaluation of the celebrity
goodwill.'('
Joe argued that celebrity goodwill, if it existed, was a product of his
innate talent and therefore not subject to valuation and division upon
marital dissolution. 65 The court side-stepped Joe's arguments on this
issue."'6 Further, Joe could have made arguments to try to limit the
amount of the celebrity goodwill valuation by using the court's own
analogy to Joe's right of publicity limited by his right of privacy."
However, given the court's treatment of his talent arguments, this court
very likely would have ignored the rights of publicity/privacy arguments as
well.
In the situation facing the court, complete equity was impossible. The
intangible nature of goodwill makes any award upon dissolution inherently
speculative. 16  Further, the hazards associated with assessing and award-
ing future earnings," coupled with the unpredictable nature of Joe's
chosen career, 7° did not yield a simple solution. Nevertheless, the
Piscopo court should have explicitly stated its equitable objectives,
addressed the contradictory supreme court precedent, and granted an award
that was rationally related to the ends the court sought to achieve.
Given that the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied Joe certiora-
ri,' thus allowing the appellate decision to stand, it does not seem that
161. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 113.
164. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 56 and discussion part M.B.
171. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 564 A.2d 875 (NJ. 1989).
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the inequities and inconsistencies present in the Piscopo case will be
addressed anytime soon. Thus, a celebrity who divorces in New Jersey
should expect a claim from the non-celebrity spouse for a share in the
celebrity goodwill. The celebrity should also expect the New Jersey court
to find that celebrity goodwill exists. Further, the celebrity should expect
the court to use a completely irrational formula to value the celebrity
goodwill, and the celebrity should be prepared to shoulder the burden of an
award based on such a formula. In short, any married celebrity living in
New Jersey should move his or her family out of the state before the
honeymoon is over.
Joseph Montes*
* Ironically, this author would like to dedicate this Note to his wife, Sarah, for her love,
dedication, and support.
